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ABSTRACT 
Electric vehicle has attracted more and more attention all around the world in recent years because of its many advan- 
tages such as low pollution to the environment. However, due to the limitation of current technology, charging remains 
an important issue. In this paper, we study the problem of finding and making reservation on charging stations via a 
vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). Our focus is on the privacy concern as drivers would not like to be traced by 
knowing which charging stations they have visited. Technically, we make use of the property of blind signature to 
achieve this goal. In brief, an electric vehicle first generates a set of anonymous credentials on its own. A trusted au- 
thority then blindly signs on them after verifying the identity of the vehicle. After that, the vehicle can make charging 
station searching queries and reservations by presenting those signed anonymous credentials. We implemented the 
scheme and show that the credential signing process (expected to be the most time consuming step) can be completed 
within reasonable time when the parameters are properly set. In particular, the process can be completed in 5 minutes 
when 1024 bits of RSA signing key is used. Moreover, we show that our scheme is secure in terms of authentication 
and privacy-preserving. 
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1. Introduction 
Electric Vehicle (EV) has attracted a lot of attention all 
around the world in recent years due to its many advan- 
tages such as low noise, low energy consumption and 
low pollution. However, the distance that can be trav- 
elled by an electric vehicle with onboard battery fully 
charged is usually shorter than that can be travelled by a 
conventional fossil fuel powered vehicle with the gas 
tank fully filled. Thus a driver has to search in advance 
the charging stations it has to visit in order for it to have 
enough power to complete the whole journey. On the 
other hand, since charging up a battery usually take much 
longer time than filling up a fossil fuel tank, long queues 
at charging stations may be resulted. Thus a reservation 
mechanism is desirable. 
Before continuing our discussion, let us briefly talk 
about what a VANET is. VANET is an important ele-
ment of the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [1]. 
In a typical VANET, each vehicle is assumed to have an 
on-board unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU) 
installed along the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and 
maybe some other application servers are installed in the 
backend. The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) proto- 
col [2] over the wireless channel while the RSUs, TA, 
and the application servers communicate using a secure 
fixed network (e.g. the Internet). The basic application of 
a VANET is to allow arbitrary vehicles to broadcast 
safety messages (e.g. about vehicle speed, turning direc- 
tion, road condition, traffic accident information) to other 
nearby vehicles (denoted as vehicle-vehicle or V2V 
communications) and to RSU (denoted as vehicle-infra- 
structure or V2I communications) regularly such that 
other vehicles may adjust their travelling routes and 
RSUs may inform the traffic control center to adjust traf- 
fic lights for avoiding possible traffic congestion. As 
such, a VANET can also be interpreted as a sensor net- 
work because the traffic control center or some other 
central servers can collect lots of useful information 
about road conditions from vehicles. 
In this paper, we study the online charging station 
searching and reservation problem. We mainly focus on 
the security and privacy issue of the problem as most 
drivers may not want other to track his route down by *Corresponding author. 
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learning which charging stations he visited. Based on the 
source and destination of a journey, the system can 
automatically search and suggest a set of charging sta- 
tions for the driver. Reservations can also be made ac- 
cordingly. Our scheme addresses two major security prob- 
lems-authentication and privacy-preservation. In terms of 
authentication, a driver has to be properly authentic- 
cated before it can use the searching and reservation ser- 
vice. This can help to avoid an attacker from making too 
many requests and unnecessary reservations, which in 
turn blocks normal users from using the service. On the 
other hand, it makes more sense for the searching and 
reservation service to be paid ones. Otherwise, a driver 
may simply make reservations at all charging stations 
around the city so that he/she can change his/her mind 
about where to go at the very last minute. Thus authentic- 
cation is essential. In terms of privacy-preservation, a 
driver may not want others to know his/her travelling 
source, destination and even the route. We adopt the 
technique of blind signature [3] to facilitate a driver to 
obtain a valid anonymous credential. Then the driver can 
make searching and reservation queries as well as get 
his/her vehicle charged up at charging stations by pre- 
senting the anonymous credential. We use the term 
“anonymous” here because the credential can prove that 
the holder has been properly authenticated but no one can 
deduce the identity of the driver based only on the cre- 
dential itself. 
Privacy-preservation can then be achieved. 
We provide a security analysis and we implemented 
the scheme to evaluate our scheme. Throughout our 
scheme, the most time-consuming part should be the 
credential signing process by the trusted authority. It may 
even become a bottleneck if lots of vehicles request it for 
signing operation at about the same time. Through our 
study, we show that such a credential signing process can 
be completed in reasonable time when the parameters are 
properly set. The process takes about 5 minutes when 
1024 bits of RSA signing key is used. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related 
work is reviewed in Section 2. The system model, 
charging model, assumptions and security requirements 
are listed in Section 3. Our schemes are described in de-
tails in Section 4. The analysis and evaluation of our 
schemes are given in Sections 5-7. Finally, Section 8 con-
cludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
The idea of searching charging stations using VANET is 
new. However, there are some existing similar VANET 
applications published in recent years. For example, in 
[4], a VANET-based smart parking scheme for large 
parking lots was proposed. Though they also consider 
security, there are a number of differences between their 
scheme and ours. First, their scheme is of a small scale 
which covers a car park while ours is large scale to cover 
the whole city and beyond. Second, in their scheme a car 
park is monitored by three RSUs which take up the roles 
of determining a vehicle’s location, searching for a va- 
cant parking space and providing navigation service to 
guide the vehicle to go from the car park entrance to the 
selected parking space. In our scheme, the road system is 
covered by a large number of charging stations which 
report their status in a distributed manner. Third, our 
scheme allows one’s identity and charging station searching 
query to be delinked. This feature is only interesting for 
wide area searching like ours. Forth, our scheme allows a 
driver to make a reservation at a charging station. Again, 
this feature is only interesting for a wide area setting like 
ours. Thus, the scheme provided in [4] cannot be used to 
solve the charging station searching problem discussed in 
this paper. 
Other interesting VANET application recently pub-
lished include [5,6]. In [5], an interesting problem about 
providing querying service using VANET while ensuring 
that queries will not be linkable to the queriers was dis-
cussed. A solution for solving the problem by using 
techniques of pseudo-identity, indistinguishable creden-
tials, and oblivious transfer was then proposed. Although 
it also provides a way for a vehicle to anonymously ob-
tain credentials, all credentials are assumed to be identi-
cal and so the approach cannot be adopted into our SPCS 
scheme in which credentials carry different times of is-
suance and values. In [6], a new real-time urban moni-
toring system using the Localizing and Handling Net-
work Event Systems (LocHNESs) platform developed by 
Telecom Italia was developed. Information about urban 
mobility in real time, ranging from traffic conditions to 
the movements of pedestrians throughout the city, can be 
collected efficiently. However, security issues were not 
mentioned in this work. 
In terms of security, recent efforts related to the secu- 
rity issues in VANET include [7-13]. In [7], a batch veri- 
fication scheme known as IBV was proposed for an RSU 
to verify a large number of signatures at the same time 
using only three pairing operations. In [8], an RSU-aided 
inter-vehicle communications scheme was proposed. A 
vehicle relies on an RSU to verify the signature of an- 
other vehicle. In [9], group communications in VANETs 
are considered and a group key update protocol was 
proposed. In [10], some security and privacy-enhancing 
communications schemes were proposed. Of particular 
interest, a group communications protocol was defined. 
After a simple handshaking with any RSU, a group of 
known vehicles can verify the signature of each other 
without any further support from RSUs. A common 
group secret is also developed for secure communica- 
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tions among group members. [11,12] also target at driver 
privacy preservation but instead of using pseudo identi- 
ties, the concept of group signature is adopted. The sig- 
nature of any vehicle can be verified by the same group 
key but the actual signer can only be traced by a trusted 
party. Though privacy can be preserved, these schemes 
are rather complicated and may not be practical. In [13], 
a threshold anonymous announcement service using di- 
rect anonymous attestation and one-time anonymous au- 
thentication to simultaneously achieve the goals of reli- 
ability, privacy and auditability was proposed. However, 
it focuses on inter-vehicle message authentication in 
general and is not related to querying. 
Our scheme is based on the idea of indistinguishable 
(anonymous) credential. Such a credential system was 
introduced by Chaum [14]. The system allows a user to 
obtain a credential from one organization and later show 
the possession of the credential to another organization 
while the transactions at the two organizations are not 
linkable. The idea of anonymous credential has been 
adopted in different applications. For example, [15] pro- 
poses a credential-based privacy-preserving e-learning 
system under which a student can show his/her progress 
in e-learning without leaking his/her identity information. 
3. Problem Statement 
3.1. System Model 
Our vehicular network consists of on-board units (OBUs) 
installed on vehicles, road-side units (RSUs) and charg- 
ing stations (CSs) along the roads, a trusted authority 
(TA) and a querying server (QS) in the backend for key 
management and for answering charging station queries 
and making reservations at charging stations, respect- 
tively. 
3.2. Charging Model 
We assume that a client will be charged for the following 
instances: 
 Making each charging station searching query: A 
driver will be charged when he/she makes charging 
station searching queries to the querying server. This 
is because the querying server operator needs to in- 
vest on facilities for the searching and scheduling 
service.  
 Making reservation at a charging station: A driver 
will be charged when he/she makes reservations to 
charging stations and the charge is proportional to the 
length of the duration reserved. This is necessary be- 
cause otherwise, a driver may tend to reserve a dura- 
tion which is longer than necessary to ensure that 
he/she does not need to wait when he/she arrives at 
the charging station concerned. 
Note that our system also supports different charging 
models. For example, an operator may want to charge a 
driver more if he/she makes reservations during peak 
hours. 
3.3. Assumptions 
We further assume the followings: 
 The TA is trusted while the QS is only semi-trusted. 
To avoid being a single point of failure, redundant 
TAs and QSs which have identical functionalities are 
installed. 
 TA, QS and RSUs communicate through a secure 
fixed network (e.g. Internet). Thus RSUs can help to 
relate messages from vehicles on the road to TA and 
QS. 
 There exists a conventional public key infrastructure 
(PKI) for initial vehicle authentication. Each vehicle 
Vi having license plate number LPi has a conventional 
public key VPKi and a conventional private key VSKi 
and is given a TA-signed certificate VCerti which 
contains CPKi and LPi. We will discuss details about 
the generation and verification of Certi in Section 4. 
 There also exists a conventional identity-based public 
key infrastructure (PKI) for authenticating TA, QS 
and CSs. The public keys of TA and QS are the same 
as their real identities, TRID and QRID respectively, 
and are known by everyone. Also any charging sta-
tion CSi broadcasts its public key which is the same as 
its real identity CRIDi with hello messages periodi-
cally to vehicles that are travelling close to it. Thus 
CRIDi is known by all vehicles nearby. The validity 
CRIDi can be ensured using a certificate CCerti issued 
by the TA. We will discuss the details in Section 4.  
 The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the 
TA and itself but not by others. 
 We assume that there is a reasonably large number of 
charging station searching queries issued to QS. Oth- 
erwise, if there is only one query, the sender can be 
linked up with the query easily. 
 Each vehicle has a tamper-proof device which is re- 
sponsible for all cryptographic-related functions such 
as storage of keys, generation of pseudo identities, 
signing messages and encryption of messages (details 
will be given one by one in the next section). Also its 
output interface is limited and we will specify that in 
the appropriate places in the next section. Finally, it is 
assumed to have its own clock for generating correct 
time stamps and be able to run on its own battery. 
Note that a vehicle can also have a conventional 
computer device for performing the verification of 
RSUs’ hop information (to speed up the process and 
details will be given in the next section). Since a tam- 
per-proof device is always associated with a dedi- 
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cated vehicle, we will use these two terms interchangea- 
bly without prior notice throughout the paper. 
3.4. Security Requirements 
We aim at designing a scheme to provide VANET-based 
charging station searching and reservation service for 
electric vehicles. The scheme has to satisfy the following 
two security requirements: 
 Message integrity and authentication: A vehicle sh- 
ould be authenticated before it can request for creden-
tial signing, issue a charging station searching query, 
make reservations to charging stations and receive 
charging service at charging stations. On the other 
hand, TA, QS and vehicles are able to verify that a 
message is indeed sent and signed by a certain party 
without being modified by anyone. 
 Privacy-preserving: In this paper, the privacy of a 
driver is defined as his driving habit and travelling 
route. It can be preserved by two means. First, even if 
TA and QS collude, they cannot link up a vehicle’s 
query (which contains the travelling source and des-
tination) with its real identity. Thus no one can trace a 
driver’s travelling route and driving habit easily. 
Second, a vehicle’s query (which contains the travel-
ling source and destination) as well as the list of 
charging stations returned by QS can not be eaves-
dropped by neighboring vehicles easily. 
4. Our Solutions—SPCS 
This section presents our Secure and Privacy-preserving 
Charging-station Searching (SPCS) scheme using VANET. 
Our scheme consists of five phases—setup phase, credential 
signature requesting phase, charging station searching 
and reservation phase, charging phase and reconciliation 
phase. Next we explain each of these phases in details. 
4.1. Setup Phase 
During system startup, the following steps will be carried 
out: 
 TA assigns itself an identity TRID and a secret key 
TSK such that TRID and TSK form a public and pri-
vate key pair. TRID is assumed to be known by eve-
ryone in the system.  
 TA assigns QS an identity QRID and a secret key 
QSK such that QRID and QSK form a public and pri-
vate key pair.  
 For each charging station CSi locating at CLi an iden-
tity CRIDi and a secret key CSKi such that CRIDi and 
CSKi form a public and private key pair. To facilitate 
others to verify CSi’s identity, TA generates its cer- 
tificate as  
 ,  ,i i TSK i iCCerti CRID CL TSIG CRID CL  where 
 TSK i iTSIG CRID CL  is TA’s signature on the con- 
catenation of CRIDi and CLi. Note that any asymmet-
ric signature scheme can be used in the above steps. 
 During system setup or first registration of an electric 
vehicle Vi, TA assigns it a real identity VRIDi and the 
tamper-proof device activation password VPWDi. TA 
also assigns Vi a license plate number LPi and gener-
ates a pair of conventional public and private keys, 
VPKi and VSKi respectively. TA then signs a certifi-  
cate   ,  ,  i i i TSK i iVCert LP VPK TSIG LP VPK   
where  .TSK i iTSIG LP VPK  TA preloads VRIDi, 
VPWDi, LPi, VSKi and VCerti into the tamper-proof 
device on Vi. 
Throughout the paper, conventional asymmetric and 
symmetric encryptions and signatures are used at some 
locations. To make the context concise, let us use the 
notations  _ xAS ENC M  and    _ ,x xS ENC M SIG M  
to denote asymmetrically encrypting, symmetrically en- 
crypting and signing message M using the key x based on 
any asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption and 
signature algorithms, respectively. 
4.2. Credential Signature Requesting Phase 
At the beginning of a charging period (say a month) or 
when a driver uses up all the credentials in hand, the 
driver triggers the tamper-proof device on his/her electric 
vehicle Vi to send the following credential signing re- 
quest message to the TA:  
 _ _ , , _ _i VSKiCred Sig Req VCert SIG Cred Sig Req .  
TA verifies the signature  us-   _ _VSKiSIG Cred Sig Req
ing Vi’s public key VPKi as stored in VCerti. If successful, 
TA generate a random session key SESS_KEY and se-
curely transmits it to Vi’s tamper-proof device. That is 







AS ENC SESS KEY
TSIG AS ENC SESS KEY
  
Upon finishing verifying TA’s signature with TRID, the 
tamperproof device stores SESS_KEY locally for ongoing 
communi- cations. 
Next the tamper-proof device generates a set of cre- 
dentials for the TA to sign. Each credential Credk is of 
the form , , ,k k k kCN TOI Val Sig  where CNk is a unique 
credential number (i.e. different credentials have differ-
ent credential numbers), TOIk indicates the time that the 
credential is issued, Valk is the duration that the electric 
vehicle can get charged up by presenting that credential. 
Sample values include 5, 10 and 15 (minutes) and the 
value depends on the kind of electric vehicle as well as 
the capacity of the onboard battery. Since a driver also 
needs a credential for the charging station searching ser-
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vice, such a credential carries a special value of 0. Sigk 
represents the TA’s signature on the first three fields and 
will be filled up later. For the credential of a certain 
value, the tamper-proof device generates N times more 
credentials than necessary (i.e. among every N creden- 
tials, only one credential will be used while the other (N 
– 1) credentials are only for checking purpose which we 
will describe in later context). For each credential, the 
tamper-proof device transforms the bit pattern of the  
concatenation k k kCN TOI Val  into   .k k k CTV Trans CN TOI Val  k
formed credentials altogether to the TA for blind signa- 
ture. To avoid the credentials being stolen or tampered 
by eavesdroppers, all of them are encrypted symmetri- 
cally using SESS_KEY and signed using VSKi before they 
are sent out. 
 It then sends the trans-  
For every N credentials with the same value, TA ran-
domly challenges the tamper-proof device to open  –1N  
of them and checks whether they are of proper format 
(including whether any two of them have the same cre-
dential number, whether TOIk is really close to the cur-
rent time, whether all the  credentials have the 
same value). If yes, TA blindly signs the remaining cre-
dential (i.e. the one that was not opened) and sends it 
back to the temper-proof device. Similar to the above, all 
communications are symmetrically encrypted using the 
session key SESS_KEY to resist against eavesdroppers. 
Also the messages from Vi and TA are signed using VSKi 
and TSK respectively by the corresponding party. 
 –1N 

After that, the tamper-proof device retrieves the actual 
signed credentials by removing the hiding factors. That is, 
for each credential, it de-transforms TSK kSIG CTV   back  
into  TSK k k kSIG CN TOI Val  by performing     .TSK k k k TSK kSIG CN TOI Val DTrans SIG CTV   At  
this moment, the tamper-proof device can fill up all TA 
signatures in all credentials. The tamper-proof device 
stored all credentials locally. 
Finally, TA records the total number of credentials 
which it has blindly signed and their values into its local 
database (to be used in reconciliation phase). 
4.3. Charging Station Searching and Reservation 
Phase 
When a driver starts up his/her electric vehicle Vi for a 
journey, he/she first enters the real identity VRIDi and 
password VPWDi (assigned by TA in Section 4.2 above) 
into the tamper-proof device to activate it. Here only 
simple hardware checking is involved. If either the real 
identity or the password is, or both are incorrect, the 
tamper-proof device refuses to perform further opera-
tions. Otherwise, the tamper-proof device prompts the 
driver to enter the travelling source Srci and destination 
Desti. The tamper-proof device then randomly picks up a 
credential Credk with value 0 (i.e. those for searching 
purpose) from its pool, composes the message   _ QRID kAS ENC Cred Src Dest  and sends it to the que- 
rying server (QS). Note that no signature is required here 
because the tamper-proof device will hide its real identity 
from now on. 
Upon receiving the message from Vi, QS first decrypts 
the message using its private key QSK. It then checks 
whether the attached credential Credk is a valid one by 
checking the validity of TA's signature using TRID. If it 
is valid, it also checks whether the same credential (same 
credential number and same time of issurance) has been 
used before. To achieve this goal, QS maintains a local 
database for storing the pair  of all re- 
ceived credentials and the checking becomes a simple 
linear scanning. If so unluckily the credential has been 
used, the QS asks the driver to present another credential 
by sending it the signed message  
 ,k kCN TOI 
 




Cred Used CN TOI
SIG Cred Used CN TOI
 
The above validation process then repeats. The driver 
records the previous credential as unused but will not use 
it any more in the future. He/she also records the QS’s 
signed message so that he/she could later present it to TA 
(to avoid unnecessary charging). 
If the above validation is successful, based on the res-
ervation status of the charging stations and the real-time 
road conditions (reported by OBUs and RSUs as dis-
cussed in [10]), QS suggests the locations of one or more 
charging stations together with the charging durations at 
each charging station to the driver. Note that the search- 
ing of charging stations is actually another non-trivial 
scheduling problem and we will leave it as our future 
work. To summarize, the searching and reservation proc- 
ess should guarantee that: 
 The charging stations have enough power when the 
electric vehicle Vi arrives (since under smart grid 
framework, power is supplied on an on-demand 
manner); and 
 The total delay experienced by Vi is minimized. The 
total delay here includes travelling delay (to be re-
flected by the fact that whether the chosen charging 
stations are close enough to the original travelling 
route) and queuing delay at charging stations (since 
an electric vehicle usually takes much longer time for 
charging up than for filling up the fossil fuel tank). 
Since the credential number CNk of the credential 
Credk is only known by the tamper-proof device and QS, 
we makes use of it to develop a secure channel (i.e. 
symmetric encryption using the key CNk) for ongoing 
communications between Vi and QS from now on. QS 
replies the tamper-proof device the set of charging sta- 
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tions (with identities and locations) and charging dura- 
tions at each charging station via the secure channel and 
requests it to submit the appropriate number of creden-
tials for reservation purpose. The tamper-proof device 
submits the credentials via the secure channel in return. 
In some cases, a driver may dislike one or more charging 
stations suggested. For example, the driver may have 
arguments with the staff at a certain charging station be-
fore. In this case, he/she can request QS to provide a re-
placement set of charging stations by eliminating the 
charging stations he/she dislikes. The above process then 
repeats. Similar to the above, any message sent by QS to 
Vi is signed using QSK to avoid being tampered by 
eavesdroppers on its way. 
For simplicity, we assume that the credentials will be 
used in sequence. That is, the first credential in the sub- 
mitted list of credentials will be used at the charging sta- 
tion closest to Srci while the last credential in the sub- 
mitted list of credentials will be used at the charging sta- 
tion closest to Desti. After validating the submitted cre- 
dentials, QS distributes them to the charging stations in 
order. Note that QS and charging stations are connected 
via a fixed infrastructure and so we assume that the 
communications there are secure. The charging stations 
then record the reservations accordingly by storing the 
corresponding credentials. Having the credentials, a char- 
ging station can double-verify the reservation status upon 
Vi arrives. 
4.4. Charging Phase 
The driver then drives his/her electric vehicle Vi to the 
suggested (and reserved) charging stations in sequence. 
Since the credentials are being used in sequence, based 
on QS’s suggestion (charging stations and charging dura- 
tions at them), he/she knows which credential(s) should 
be used at which charging station and can present the 
credential(s) appropriately. To resist against eavesdrop- 
pers, all credentials presented are encrypted using the 
identity CRIDj of the corresponding charging station (say 
CSj). 
Upon receiving the message, the charging station CSj 
first decrypts using its private key CSKj to obtain the 
credentials. It then checks whether it has received the 
same credential from QS (during reservation phase) be- 
fore. If yes, it serves Vi by charging it up. For commer- 
cial purpose, an electric vehicle which has not made res- 
ervation should also be served but at a lower priority. 
4.5. Reconciliation Phase 
This phase is usually done at the end of each charging 
period (say a month). The QS sends all credentials stored 
in its local database to TA. Each driver also sends the 
credentials that have not been used (as well as QS’s 
signed Cred_Used messages) to TA. For authentication 
and integrity purpose, a driver’s tamper-proof device 
signs the message using VSKi. 
Since TA has recorded the number of signed creden- 
tials and their values during the credential signature re- 
questing phase, based on the received information, it can 
now calculate how many times the driver has used the 
searching service and how many charging durations the 
driver has reserved. The driver is then charged accord- 
ingly. 
Note that our system also supports different charging 
models. For example, an operator may want to charge a 
driver more if he/she makes reservations during peak 
hours. In our system, this can be done easily by requiring 
the driver to submit more credentials during reservation 
phase. 
5. Security Analysis 
In this section, we briefly analyze our scheme with re-
spect to the security requirements listed in Section 3.4.  
 Message integrity and authentication:  
Before a vehicle can request for credential signing 
from the TA, it needs to authenticate itself using its sig- 
nature and certificate. Thus each properly-signed creden- 
tial represents the valid identity of a vehicle. Before a 
vehicle can issue a charging station searching query, 
make reservations to charging stations and receive charging 
service at charging stations, it needs to present one or 
more properly-signed credentials. Hence a vehicle is au- 
thenticated everywhere in our scheme. 
Recall that in our scheme, all messages sent by TA and 
QS are properly signed by their private keys, TSK and 
QSK, respectively and their identity, TRID and QRID, are 
assumed to be known by everyone. Thus the actual 
sender of the messages concerned can be easily guaran- 
teed. 
Since our scheme relies heavily on credentials signed 
by the TA, next we formally prove that signatures gener- 
ated by the TA is secure under the RSA assumption— 
given a public key (N, e) and a message m where N is a 
RSA modulus and e is a random number less than   ,N  
it is hard to evaluate md mod N where  N1 moded  . 
On the other hand, since we focus on the security of 
TA’s signature, we ignore the blind signature mechanism 
(in fact, a signature blindly generated by TA is equiva- 
lent to a conventional signature) and assume that all cre- 
dential numbers are randomly generated by TA. 
Theorem: TA’s signature on any credential is secure 
under the RSA assumption. If there exists an adversary A 
who makes at most qs signature queries and qc credential 
number generation queries to a random oracle and can 
successfully generate an existential forgery with an ad- 
vantage AdvA ≥ ε in time τ, we can construct a reduction 
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R which can make use of A to solve the RSA problem and 
break the RSA assumption with an advantage RAdv    
in time    such that cq    and    . 
Proof: Assume that the challenge to the reduction R is 
that given a public key  and a complete set of 
credential contents (credential value, time of issuance 
and value where the latter two are denoted as TV* while 
all three are denoted as CTV*, to compute CTV* mod N 
where d is the private key corresponding to 
 ,N e
 ,N e . R 
sends  to A and A can make qs signature queries 
and qc credential number generation queries (i.e. given 
time of issuance and value, to generate a credential 
number to complete the credential content) to R. To fa- 
cilitate the execution of the game, R creates a variable i 
(initialized to 1) to record the number of credential num- 
ber generation queries received so far. It maintains a ta- 
ble with entries i  and simulates the 
signature and credential number generation queries as 
described below. It also chooses a random 
 ,N e
 , ,i iCTV CTV dTV
 * 1 ci q , 
sets TVi* = TV* and sets CTVi* = CTV*. 
We first talk about the simulation of signature queries 
upon given time of issuance and value . If there al- 
ready exists an entry in the table , then it re- 
turns y as the signature. If there does not exist an entry 
with message TV, then it picks a random number y and 
sets CTV to ye and adds the entry  to the table.  







Note that y is a valid signature for TV since  mod 
N = y. It then sends y to A as a response to its signature 
query. If the queried time of issuance and value are TV* 
(i.e. the i*th entry), R quits since it does not know how to 
answer. 
 dey
Next we talk about the simulation of credential num- 
ber generation queries upon given time of issuance and 
value TV. If i ≠ i*, then R picks a random number y and 
sets CTV to ye and adds the entry  to the   , ,eTV y y
table. Note that y is a valid signature for TV since  
mod N = y. It then sends ye to A as a response to its cre- 
dential number generation query. But if this is the i*th 
credential number generation query, R updates TVi* = TV 
and returns CTV* as a response. 
 dey
Finally, A is allowed to forge a signature and send to R. 
Since we assume that A needs R’s help in generating a 
credential number, the signature must correspond to one 
of the CTV values queried before. With a probability 1/ 
qc, A will forge a signature corresponding to the i*th entry. 
R can then resolve the challenge of computing CTV* mod 
N. 
Therefore, AdvR ≥ ϵ/qc. This leads to a contradiction to 
the RSA assumption and so we can conclude that TA’s 
signature on any credential is secure.  
 Privacy preserving:  
In our scheme, the only place that a vehicle shows its 
real identity is when it presents its signature and certifi- 
cate during credential signature requesting phase and 
reconciliation phase. For all other phases including charg- 
ing station searching and reservation phase and charging 
phase, a vehicle only presents an anonymous credential 
signed by the TA. Since the anonymous credential does 
not carry any information about the vehicle’s identity, 
even TA and QS collude, no one knows who is perform- 
ing which charging station query and who will visit 
which charging station.  
During charging station searching and reservation 
phase, the travelling source and destination of a driver is 
first encrypted using QS’s public key before sending out. 
Thus no third party can eavesdrop them. For the search- 
ing results (i.e. the set of suggested charging stations and 
charging durations) by QS, they are encrypted using the 
unique credential number of the credential presented by 
the driver. Since that credential number is only known by 
the driver and QS (even TA does not know it due to the 
property of blind signature), no third party can obtain the 
results as well. 
Therefore, the driver’s privacy is preserved. 
6. Analysis on Time Complexity 
In this section, we briefly analyze the time complexity of 
our SPCS scheme. Note that we ignore the time com- 
plexity involved in setup phase since it can be done off- 
line and is only done once occasionally (e.g. when TA 
wants to update the parameters). It is not critical to the 
efficiency of our scheme. 
We let Tsenc, Tsdec, Taenc, Tadec, Tsig and Tver denote the 
time required to perform symmetric encryption, symmet- 
ric decryption, asymmetric encryption, asymmetric de- 
cryption, signature generation and signature verification 
operations respectively. These operations dominate the 
efficiency of our scheme, so we only consider the time 
taken by these operations and neglect all others. 
According to Section 4.2, during the credential signature 
requesting phase, the tamper-proof device on vehicle Vi 
takes Tsig of time to produce . 
TA then takes Tver of time to verify this signature. Next 
TA takes Taenc of time to produce  
 _ _VSKiSIG Cred Sig Req
 _ _VPKiAS ENC SESS KEY  and Tsig of time to produce 
the signature    _ _ENC SESS KEYTSK VPKi . 
Upon receiving the message, the tamper-proof device on 
vehicle Vi takes Tadec of time to decrypt  
TSIG AS
 _ _VPKiAS ENC SESS KEY  and takes Tver of time to ver- 
ify the signature   _ _ENC SESS KEYTSK VPKi
For each credential, the tamper-proof device on vehi- 
cle Vi takes Tsenc of time to symmetrically encrypt it and 
takes Tsig of time to sign it. For each unopened credential, 
TA takes Tsig of time to blindly sign it. Since the creden- 
tial signing process should be the most time-consuming 
part in our whole SPCS scheme, we will analyze its per- 
TSIG AS . 
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formance further using implementation in Section 7. 
According to Section 4.3, during the charging station 
searching and reservation phase, the tamper-proof device 
on vehicle Vi takes Taenc of time to produce   _ .QRID kAS ENC Cred Src Dest  QS then takes Tadec of 
time to decrypt the message and takes Tver of time to 
check the validity of Credk by verifying TA’s signature 
on it. If so unluckily the credential has been used, QS 
takes Tsig of time to generate the signature  _ .QSK k kSIG Cred Used CN TOI  For all ongoing com- 
munications, the tamper-proof device on Vi and QS takes 
Tsenc for symmetric encryption or takes Tsdec of time for 
symmetric decryption. For any message sent by QS to Vi, 
QS takes Tsig of time to sign it while the tamper-proof 
device on Vi takes Tver of time to verify the signature. 
According to Section 4.4, during the charging phase, 
the tamper-proof device on vehicle Vi takes Taenc of time 
to encrypt each credential. The charging station CSj then 
takes Tadec to decrypt it. 
According to Section 4.5, during the reconciliation 
phase, the tamper-proof device on vehicle Vi takes Tsig of 
time to sign all unused credentials. Accordingly, TA 
takes Tver of time to verify the signature. 
Next let us summarize the time complexity of secure 
taxi service scheme in Table 1. 
7. Implementation Results 
Throughout our scheme, the most time-consuming part 
should be the credential signing process by the trusted 
authority. It may even become a bottleneck if lots of ve- 
hicles request it for signing operation at about the same 
time. In this section, we present our implementation re- 
sults and show that the credential signing process can be 
completed in reasonable time when the parameters are 
properly set. 
We have written a test program in Java to measure the 
actual time required for the TA to sign the credentials. 
The TA is implemented on a laptop computer with an 
Intel Core 2 Duo CPU, T5870@2 GHz and all signing 
processes run on a single core. We assume that the TA 
has to sign 10,000 credentials at a certain instance. The 
results are shown in Figure 1. From the figure, we can 
see that longer signing time is required when the length 
of TA’s private key (i.e. TSK) gets longer. 
Since 512 bits RSA keys are proved to be insecure 
nowadays, let us compare the cases with 1024 bits and 
2048 bits RSA key for TSK in depth. Assume that on 
average, an electric vehicle uses 150 credentials per day. 
Then for each month, each vehicle uses 4500 credentials 
per month. For our scheme, we set N to 10 (i.e. for every 
10 credentials submitted by a vehicle, the TA only signs 
1 of them and the other 9 are for checking purpose). This 
means that the TA needs to sign at least 45,000 creden- 
tials for each client. From the data we obtained from the 
experiment, signing 45,000 tickets using a consumer PC 
with 1024 bits RSA key for TSK needs about 5 minutes. 
If 2048 bits RSA key is used, it needs about 37 minutes. 
Assume that the TA server can run for 24 hours a day so 
that it can keep on signing credentials for different vehi- 
cles, about 43,200 vehicles can be supported by the sys- 
tem if 1024 bits RSA key is used and about 1168 vehi- 
cles can be supported if 2048 bits RSA key is used. Nev- 
ertheless, recall that the TA server is usually more pow- 
erful than a conventional laptop computer. This means 
that the signing process can be done much faster. It is 
also straight forward to apply multi-threading technique 
for the credential signing process and multiple TA serv- 
ers can be used for this purpose. 
Besides credential signing, vehicles need to prepare 
the binding factors which also require modular exponent- 
tiation. However, we suggest that the exponent part of 
the public key can be assigned a small number. In this 
way, the exponentiation can be done in a much shorter 
time. This also allows us to use a cheaper device (i.e. a 
conventional computer or even a smart card) on the client 
side.  
 
Table 1. Time complexity of spcs scheme. 
Phase Time Complexity 
Credential signature 
requesting 
 sig adec ver iT T T V   
 TAver aenc sigT T T   
Credential signing 
 senc sig iT T V  (for each credential) 





 aenc iT V    QSadec verT T
 QSsigT  (if credential has been used) 
    senc sdec ver iT T T V   
(for each ongoing communication) 
 QSsenc sig sdecT T T  
(for each ongoing communication) 
Charging phase  aenc iT V    adec jT CS
Reconciliation  sig iT V   TAverT  
 
 
Figure 1. Time to sign 10,000 Credentials vs Size of TSK. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we addressed the problem of privacy-pre- 
serving charging station searching and reservation for 
electric vehicles. We made use of the property of blind 
signature to achieve this goal. In brief, an electric vehicle 
first generates a set of anonymous credentials on its own. 
A trusted authority then blindly signs on them after veri- 
fying the identity of the vehicle. After that, the vehicle 
can make charging station searching queries and reserve- 
tions by presenting those signed anonymous credentials. 
Throughout our scheme, the most time-consuming part 
should be the credential signing process by the trusted 
authority. It may even become a bottleneck if lots of ve- 
hicles request it for signing operation at about the same 
time. Through implementation, we showed that such a 
credential signing process could be completed in reason- 
able time when the parameters were properly set. The 
process could be as quickly as 5 minutes when 1024 bits 
of RSA signing key was used. Moreover, we showed that 
our scheme is secure enough in terms of authentication 
and privacy-preserving. In the future, we will work out 
an approximate solution for the querying server to opti- 
mistically schedule electric vehicles to charging stations 
around the city. 
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